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Abstract. Avionic systems involve complex time-dependent behaviors
across interacting components. This paper presents a contract-based app-
roach for formally verifying these behaviors in a compositional manner. A
unique feature of our contract-based tool is the support of architectural
specification for multi-rate platforms. An abstraction technique has also
been developed for properties related to variable time bounds. Prelimi-
nary results on applying this approach to the verification of an aircraft
cabin pressure control system are promising.
Recent years have seen a large growth in the size and complexity of avionics
systems due to increasing system functionality and closer integration among
existing and new aircraft subsystems. Verifying the safety of these systems and
their compliance with their intended functional requirements is a critical certiﬁ-
cation objective that is becoming prohibitively expensive due to this increasing
complexity. Compositional veriﬁcation approaches [1,2] manage the veriﬁcation
complexity by decomposing requirements into component-level contracts and
applying assume-guarantee reasoning. Contract-based tools such as AGREE [3]
and OCRA [2] have been used in recent eﬀort to formally verify control mod-
ules in avionic systems. Most existing work has focused primarily on verifying
safety properties, e.g., the system must not exhibit behaviors that can result
in a catastrophic failure. Using such techniques to verify complex behavioral
requirements of a system in a distributed setting, however, has not received
much attention. In many avionics application domains such as ﬂight controls,
cockpit displays, ﬂight management, and environment control systems, a vari-
ety of complex time-dependent behaviors are present that can cut across several
components. Verifying such behaviors for compliance to the intended functional
requirements is essential and has been traditionally accomplished using testing
techniques that can be expensive but still not exhaustive in revealing the pres-
ence of errors. There is a strong need for a veriﬁcation approach that can enable
scalable use of formal veriﬁcation (e.g., model checking) tools for complex time-
bounded properties and the composition of such properties over components in
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a distributed environment. This short paper presents a compositional approach
of verifying such systems involving complex time-dependent behaviors.
1 Case Study Example
The motivating case study for this work comes from aircraft cabin pressure
and environment control system applications. In a typical mechanical system
with sensors and actuators, it is necessary to perform calibration, initialization,
or other built-in-tests on these components (e.g., a pressure sensor) only at
certain speciﬁc times in successive aircraft takeoﬀ and landing cycles. The speciﬁc
signal to invoke this activity is called finalize event in this example, and
it is triggered after the aircraft door is open for a minimum amount of time.
Figure 1 shows the components involved in triggering this event. The Timing
Computation module computes the amount of time the door should be open
before the finalize event is triggered as a function of altitude reached during
ﬂight. The Mode Transition Logic controls the changes in aircraft modes, for
example LANDING (L) to GROUND (G). The Mode Detect Logic module evaluates
sensor values to determine the current aircraft state, for example, if the aircraft
is on the ground or climbing. The mode, state, and timing all inform the decision
when to ﬁnalize the aircraft. This example illustrates an end-to-end subsystem
from sensors to actuator, even though it is only a small part of an environmental
control system. Depending on the architectural platform, components in this
subsystem may be physically distributed across the aircraft. For instance, each
component executes periodically (with diﬀerent rates) and communicates with
one another over a shared bus.
Fig. 1. Case study example – diagram of interacting component subsystems
The finalize event signal is activated by several events and aircraft states
occurring in a particular temporal sequence shown in the Simulink diagram of
Fig. 2. The door may open any time after landing, and once it has been open
continuously for door open time, the finalize event is broadcast.
Additionally, the activation must occur only once in a landing-to-takeoﬀ cycle
even through certain states of aircraft (e.g., door opening or closing) may change
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Fig. 2. Diagram of “Post Landing Finalize” subsystem
Table 1. Requirements for the “Post Landing Finalize” subsystem
Requirement 1 A finalize event will be broadcast after the aircraft door has been
open continuously for door open time seconds while the aircraft
is on the ground after a successful landing.
Requirement 2 A finalize event is broadcast only once while the aircraft is on the
ground.
Requirement 3 The finalize event will not occur during flight.
Requirement 4 The finalize event will not be enabled while the aircraft door is
closed.
multiple times after a landing and before the next takeoﬀ. It is also essential that
the activation state for finalize event is reset after broadcast so that it is ready
to be activated for the next landing-takeoﬀ cycle. The requirements for the “Post
Landing Finalize” subsystem are outlined in Table 1.
The assumptions in Table 2 must be proven on upstream components. The
proofs of the requirements for this module depend on the possibility of the nec-
essary sequence of inputs. Note that because the modules may run at diﬀerent
rates, the assumption that mode transitions directly from LANDING to GROUND
does not require a direct transition in the Mode Transition Logic module. It
could be possible to transition through a third state, as long as it is possible
to reach Ground before Post Landing Finalize can see the intermediate state.
The translation of assumptions to requirements on upstream components must
take into account diﬀerent rates of execution. Assumption 3 is not speciﬁc about
the deﬁnition of “aircraft is on the ground.” This would likely be formalized
as altitude is within some tolerance of zero since that is the only signal into
the Timing Computation module on which the proof of this assumption will fall.
Assumption 4 is more of an assertion that the door will not be open during ﬂight.
As an user-driven input signal, this cannot be proven using upstream modules;
but it does assure Requirement 3.
Contract-Based Verification of Complex Time-Dependent Behaviors 37
Table 2. Assumption for the “Post Landing Finalize” subsystem
Assumption 1 ac on ground can be true before the mode transitions to GROUND.
Assumption 2 The mode can transition directly from LANDING to GROUND as
observed by “Post Landing Finalize.”
Assumption 3 door open time does not change while the aircraft is on the ground.
Assumption 4 door closed must be true if ac on ground is false.
2 Verification Techniques and Tools
2.1 Translation of Simulink Models and Contract Language
The integration of Simulink into a high-assurance design ﬂow can bring signiﬁ-
cant beneﬁts especially for safety-critical applications. Our tool Sim2SAL auto-
mates the generation of formal models by translating Simulink designs into tran-
sition systems in SAL. A unique feature in our tool is the support for real-time
multi-rate systems. Sim2SAL allows the speciﬁcation of the multi-rate architec-
ture as annotations attached to Simulink subsystems. An example annotation is
shown below that describes the timing characteristics of a periodically executing
subsystem.
arch_begin
period: 5 ms; /* the subsystem executes every 5 ms */
jitter: 0.1 ms; /* max jitter of the clock is 0.1 ms */
latency[1]: 1 ms; /* max latency at input port 1 is 1 ms */
init[1]: 0; /* initial value at input port 1 is 0 */
arch_end
The formal model of computation for these systems is given in [4]. Several
abstractions of multi-rate systems are also possible and handled automatically,
including zero communication delays and zero jitters. In this paper, we present
the use of Sim2SAL in verifying the properties of the case study example in the
discrete-time setting. In reality, the system is implemented on a distributed archi-
tecture with periodic components. Hence, the multi-rate model is more faithful
to the actual implementation. In such a setting, conventional assume-guarantee
methods are insuﬃcient since they were developed for discrete transition systems.
We explore compositional techniques for verifying these models in future work.
In short, the contract language of Sim2SAL consists of two parts – behavioral
speciﬁcation and architectural speciﬁcation. Similar to OCRA [2], the behavioral
part is based on Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) [5] over assume-guarantee pairs.
In addition to the typical syntax of LTL, additional constructs are provided
for simplifying expressions that involve large step sizes. For instance, we use
G [0,50] f to specify that the formula f has to hold true during the next 50 time
steps including the current one. Certain real-time properties can also be speciﬁed
at the system level. For example, an end-to-end property may require that a
request will always be serviced by a response within some t time units, where
t ∈ R. Sim2SAL uses additional timer constructs and translates these properties
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to an equivalent LTL formula involving these timers. We refer interested readers
to [4] for details of this technique. Currently, Sim2SAL can handle a subset of
Simulink’s discrete blocks. Sim2SAL takes the Simulink model (.mdl ﬁle) and
the contract annotations as input and generates an encoding of the model and
properties in SAL.
2.2 Abstraction Pattern for Variable Time Bounds
Dwyer et al. have created a Speciﬁcation and Pattern System [6] for deﬁning
various types of behaviors. Tool chains have been prototyped [7] to facilitate the
capture of requirements using such patterns such as minimum duration, bounded
response etc. For example, the minimum duration pattern speciﬁes the minimum
amount of time a formula must hold once it becomes true. There are, however,
practical considerations of model-checking complexity; a large time bound can
translate into a large number of discrete steps to be explored, resulting in expo-
nential growth of the search space. Another consideration in many systems is
that variable time bounds are provided to a component that are dynamically
computed by another component.
For example, for the “Post Landing Finalize” component, Requirement
1 in Table 1 speciﬁes a timed response where the value of door open time
for the response is dynamically computed by “Timing Calculation” compo-
nent. The Simulink model of this component (Fig. 2) contains a block named
variableTimer that receives a variable external input door open time. Due
to the dynamic value of time, one cannot express the LTL property for this
requirement as a ﬁxed duration response. Furthermore, a proof of the require-
ment’s property for a ﬁxed value of time will not be valid when the value of time
can be diﬀerent in the dynamical system.
A Timer Abstraction Pattern. Our approach is to create a timer abstraction
pattern to construct and verify properties related to variable time bounds in
a compositional manner. Consider the changes to the states and signals in the
model of Fig. 2, as the behavior for Requirement 1 is realized. Initially the state of
the finalize event is false when the aircraft is landing: the door closed input
is true and ac on ground is true before mode changes from LANDING to GROUND.
When the door closed input is false (the door is open), the variableTimer
block starts counting. Note that the relevant state variables do not change in
the time steps when the timer is just counting up. This establishes a bound
on the minimum number of steps to which the timer behavior can be collapsed
while still preserving the properties. Such an abstraction is useful in making the
veriﬁcation problem tractable for the compositional veriﬁcation of interacting
components with variable time bounds. For example, we can prove the properties
on the “Post Landing Finalize” component using a small time bound, tmin, and
specify that as an assumption for this component. We can then independently
prove this assumption, using a static analysis tool, as a guarantee provided by
the “Timing Calculation” component that it will always produce a value of
door open time ≥ tmin. This allows the application of diﬀerent types of model
checking and static analysis tools for proving properties for diﬀerent components.
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Computation of Minimum Time-Steps Bound for the Timer
Abstraction. We brieﬂy describe the algorithm to compute the minimum num-
ber of time steps tstepsmin required to explore all possible input to output
behaviors in the model while the timer (e.g., variableTimer) is counting. We
start by noting that all states in the Simulink model of interest are expressed
by unit delay blocks: a unit delay block stores the last value of its input and
outputs that stored value in the current step (higher-level blocks such as latch
and rise1Shot use unit delay blocks to hold a state variable). If a path from
an input to an output contains a unit delay in series (e.g., block prevStep) then
that adds 1 step to tstepsmin since with 1 additional step one can produce a
value at the output of the unit delay that is possible to be created at its input.
A Boolean unit delay in a feedback loop (e.g., delay2) also adds 1 to tstepsmin,
since the feedback of a Boolean variable creates a repeating sequence the sec-
ond time around the loop. Feedback loops that create an accumulator using a
numeric variable can exhibit a long non-repeating sequence of values and such
models are excluded from our analysis. Our observations across avionics systems
show that most instances of timer patterns do not have other accumulators in
the same subgraph as the timer. The algorithm is simply to enumerate all unique
paths from models inputs to relevant outputs, count the number of unit delays
(including feedback) in each path, then compute tstepsmin as the largest count
across all paths. This algorithm provides a conservative bound on tstepsmin. A
precise smaller bound can be derived by considering constraints on the variables
used in the property. Such a computation, however, complicates the analysis
algorithm while yielding little practical beneﬁt.
3 Preliminary Results and Future Work
The LTL speciﬁcations of the properties from Sect. 1 are listed in Table 3.
We have introduced two auxiliary variables. We use latch so we need not repeat
the entire landing condition in both Property 1.2 and 1.3; it also allows arbi-
trary time between landing and the opening of the door. With the timer count
variable we can capture the properties without nested temporal operators.
Table 3. Formal requirements for “Post Landing Finalize” in LTL
Requirement 1 Property 1.1 G
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
ac on ground ∧ mode = L ∧ door closed ∧




Property 1.2 G (¬finalize event ⇒ timer count ≤ 4 ∨ ¬latch)
Property 1.3 G
(
timer count ≥ 4 ∧ ¬door closed ∧ latch
⇒ finalize event
)
Requirement 2 Property 2.1 G
(
finalize event ⇒ X (G (¬finalize event ∨
(latch ∧ timer count ≥ 4 ∧ ¬door closed)))
)
Requirement 3 Property 4.1 G (door closed ⇒ X (¬finalize event))
Requirement 4
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In this case, timer count = x is equivalent to G [0,x] (¬door closed) because
timer count counts the time the door is open, and resets to 0 when the door is
closed. For these properties, we used the minimum bound analysis in Sect. 2.2
to show that four time-steps are suﬃcient to prove any property in the model.
All properties were proven in SAL using k-induction.
The assumptions in Sect. 1 implicitly underlie these proofs. As model inputs,
mode, ac on ground, and door closed are not constrained in successive values
or interaction. The fact that the finalize event follows the appropriate input
sequence does not indicate that sequence is possible. We are working to automate
the translation of those assumptions into guarantees that can be proven on
the upstream components. Other future work includes feeding the computed
minimum time bound directly to Sim2SAL to generate the timer abstraction and
translate the properties to utilize the new bound, and compositional techniques
for multi-rate systems.
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